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Adoption of new technologies and a push for money-saving value engineering designs may produce unpredictable and unwanted 
results.  Particularly with shrinking budgets, proposals that reduce initial costs become more appealing.   However, without careful 
consideration and implementation, cost-reducing measures can become more expensive in the end.  
This paper presents a case study of geostructural forensic analysis related to the failure of a helical anchor tie-down system selected to 
support an Olympic size swimming pool against hydrostatic uplift forces.  The selection of helical anchors over a more expensive 
traditional anchorage system appeared to be a smart value engineering decision for the project’s design-build construction team.  
However, structural failure occurred soon after construction.  A review of design and construction documents revealed a myriad of 
mistakes leading to the failure and very costly repair of the pool’s bottom slab.  The demolition and consequent restoration of the slab 
triggered the forensic study.   
The geostructural forensic analysis initially focused on the tension capacity of the anchorage system.  However, review of design data 
indicated several critical mistakes at the anchor-to-concrete slab connections.  Moreover, issues with final installation elevation, which 
were overlooked in the original design and construction, necessitated the need for field modification of the connection.  A step-by-step 





Any structure constructed below the water table must be able 
to successfully resist buoyant forces in order to remain in 
place.  Swimming pool structures constructed wholly or 
partially below the water table are subjected to hydrostatic 
uplift when the weight of the pool water plus the dead load of 
the pool structure is less than the weight of the volume of 
groundwater displaced by the pool.  Moreover, the design 
should also consider the case when the swimming pool is 
empty, which can be the governing case in situations 
involving uplift forces.  An anchorage system is required to 
keep these structures in place. 
 
There has been growing interest in helical pile and helical 
anchor applications in the United States since 1980’s.  The 
increasing popularity is dictated to a certain degree by a better 
familiarity and confidence in this relatively new technology 
within the construction community.  It is also driven by 
economics.  The cost for installing helical anchors is 
substantially lower than traditional driven or drilled piles.  As 
a result, the number of complex structures supported by 
helical piles is constantly rising.  The majority of these 
projects employing helical piles provide big savings.  
Nevertheless, failures do occur.  This case study shows an 
example of a helical support system failure that was caused by 





The swimming pool that is the subject of this paper was 
constructed in an area having a high groundwater table.  
According to the geotechnical report, the groundwater has a 
static level of about 1.5 m (5 ft) below existing grades.  The 
report also indicates that the water level may fluctuate 
seasonally by up to 1.2 m (4 ft).  Consequently, a dewatering 
system was needed during construction to temporarily 
drawdown the groundwater level so that the work could be 
performed “in the dry”.  Moreover, normal groundwater 
conditions necessitated that the pool design include provisions 
for an appropriate anchorage system to enable it to resist 
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hydrostatic uplift (buoyant) forces during its service life.  The 
anchorage system selected for this purpose utilized helical 
steel piles in a rectangular grid pattern, whereby, piles were 
connected to a steel anchorage assembly that was cast-in to the 
bottom slab of the pool.  Helical anchors were oriented in an 
orthogonal grid spaced at roughly 2.74 m (9 ft) on-center over 
an area approximately 50 m (164 ft) by 25 m (82 ft) in plan.  
A total of 208 anchors were installed to resist the uplift force, 





Fig. 1.  Swimming Pool’s Anchorage Layout. 
 
 
Cast-in-place reinforced concrete construction was used for 
the walls and floor of the pool.  The pool was designed as a 
liquid retaining structure with an 18 inch thick cast-in-place 
concrete bottom slab, doubly reinforced with #5 deformed 
reinforcing bars spaced at 12 inches on-center in both 
directions.  Pool walls were designed as cast-in-place 
cantilevered retaining walls. 
 
After placement of concrete walls and the bottom slab, 
temporary dewatering wells were turned off while 
construction continued with the pool being empty.  The 
bottom slab of the pool was noticed to rise approximately 
three months after the dewatering system had been turned off 
and decommissioned.  The bulge was measured to be about 15 
inches along the central portion of the pool.  This failure was 
sudden, without any apparent prior signs of distress.  The 
decision was made to partially fill the pool with water to 
counteract the buoyant force, which allowed the slab to drop 
more than half the distance toward its original position.  
 
 
DESIGN AND INSTALLATION CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Individual anchors in the interior region of the pool slab must 
resist large uplift forces.  As a minimum, the interior anchors 
used for the pool could be designed for the hydrostatic uplift 
forces acting on the tributary area of a single anchor.  In 
general, the net hydrostatic uplift force is equal to the buoyant 
force minus the weight of the pool slab. 
 
The uplift load acting on the bottom of the pool slab follows a 
simple load path.  When functioning correctly, uplift forces 
are transferred from the concrete slab through a structural 
connection to anchors and then safely into the supporting 
ground.  Even if anchors have sufficient capacity to resist 
uplift forces, the slab can still ultimately fail if at least one of 
the elements making up the force transferring connection 
system between the slab and anchors fails or if the slab is not 





A subsurface investigation including soil borings, cone 
penetrometer testing (CPT), and laboratory analyses were 
conducted by a local geotechnical firm for the design of the 
pool facility.  Soil borings indicated relatively uniform soil 
conditions at the site.  The pool area is underlain 
predominantly by marine deposits consisting of fine and 
medium poorly graded sand (SP), interlayered with silty sand 
(SM) and occasional lenses of silt (ML) and clay (CL).  The 
subgrade soils are generally loose to medium density with 
standard penetration test (SPT) values ranging between single 
digits to low teens at the upper 15 to 20 feet below the bottom 
of the pool.  There is a distinct increase in blow counts, with N 
values over 40, directly below the loose and soft upper layer.  
The CPT sounding results, presented in Fig. 2, correlate well 





Fig. 2.  CPT Sounding Results – Horizontal Red Line 
Indicates Bottom of Pool’s Slab. 
 
 
Based on the field and laboratory test results, the geotechnical 
engineer recommended 12-inch square pre-cast concrete piles 
for the pool’s wall and slab support.  Pile embedment was 
anticipated at about 35 to 40 feet below existing grades in 
order to develop required pile capacity.  The predicted 
allowable capacity in compression and in tension was 50 tons 
and 8 tons, respectively.    
 
Bottom Slab 
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Helical Anchors Design 
 
The helical anchors used on the project were manufactured by 
Hubbell Power Systems/Chance Civil Construction.  The type 
of helical anchor used was model SS5, consisting of a 1-½ 
inches square solid steel rod with three attached helix plates 8, 
10, and 12 inches in diameter.  Three different pile lengths 
(28, 32, and 36 ft) and helix configurations were considered 
for the pool anchorage system based on the location and soil 
boring data.  The selected system was designed for an 
allowable tensile capacity of 27 kips.  Catalog information for 
this model of helical anchor indicates maximum ultimate 
tensile capacity of 55 kips.  Design compressive and tensile 
resistance for this device is based on theoretical and empirical 
methods and checked in the field by installation criteria and 
limited pull-out tests on selected piles. 
 
The anchorage system used also depended on the connection 
between the helical anchor and the pool bottom slab to transfer 
uplift forces from the slab to the helical anchors.  The anchor 
cap assembly consists of a pipe sleeve and steel cap plate that 
are fitted loosely over and connected to the square shaft of the 
helical anchor.  After being assembled and attached to the 
helical anchor, it is embedded (cast) into the pool slab.  Pipe 
sleeves used on this project were originally designed to be 
connected to the helical anchor shaft using a bolted pin-
connection, as shown in Fig. 3.  This pile cap connection has 






Fig. 3. Anchor Cap Detail – Hubbell Power Systems. 
 
 
However, this connection was field modified so that the as-
built shaft-to-cap connection was welded using inconsistent 





Construction installation logs indicate that the actual anchor 
length varied between 22 to 32 feet.  All of the installed 
anchors met the driving criteria defined as 5,500 ft-lb of 
torque, or the manufacturer defined maximum twist of the 
steel rod.  A verification load test was performed on five 
anchors.  One of the tested anchors failed the 200% working 




Fig. 4. Field Modified Anchor Cap Where Helical Shaft Has 





Damage to the bottom slab of the pool necessitated its 
replacement, which allowed the opportunity for a closer look 
at the anchor and slab condition during the demolition phase.  
Field measurements confirmed that helical anchor shafts were 
1-½-inch square steel bars and that the pipe elements making 
up the pier caps were 2 inch nominal diameter standard weight 
steel pipes, as indicated on the Hubbell/Chance reference 
drawing, Fig. 3.  Cap plates, however, were found to be 
connected to the pipe sleeves by welding rather than pin-
connection. 
 
Although the reference drawing called for pre-drilled holes in 
the pipe sleeve and shaft, through which a bolt (pin) would be 
inserted to connect the shaft to the pipe, an alternate 
connection method was apparently used.  It is likely this 
change was made in the field to adjust for the random 
variations that were likely encountered in the top-of-shaft 
elevations.  These elevations could be expected to have varied 
greatly among individual anchor installations due to the 
differences in helical shaft penetration depths. 
 
Exposed steel rod tops were generally at their design 
elevations indicating adequate embedment and sufficient uplift 
capacity.  Most of the helical shaft rods exposed during 
demolition showed inelastic twist deformation of 
approximately ¼ turn in the upper eight inches of exposed 
shaft length.  The observed permanent twist deformation very 
likely occurred during installation at the maximum installation 
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torque which was sufficient to produce inelastic torsion in the 
shaft, Fig. 5. 
 
Longitudinal cracks (i.e., cracks in the long direction of the 
pool) were observed in the pool floor prior to its demolition.  
Diagonal cracks radiated out from the corners of the pool slab 
which intersected the cracks running longitudinally.  Both 
types of cracks were a result of the upward forces on the pool 





Fig. 3. Twisted Helical Anchor. 
 
 
Close study of areas where the concrete slab was removed led 
to the following observations related to the root cause of the 
pool slab hold-down failure: 
 
1. Embedded sleeve anchors did not show any sign of 
pullout from concrete slab. 
2. Slab hold-down failure appeared to have originated 
with the welded connection between the embedded 
pipe sleeve cap plate and the helical anchor shaft.  
The weld connection failure was evident for most 
helical anchor shafts exposed during demolition.  It 
was apparent that the failures occurred and 





A satisfactory structural design requires that every element of 
a structural system possess sufficient strength to safely resist 
expected design forces.  A structural system will fail when its 
weakest element cannot adequately resist applied loads.  
Structural analyses were performed to assess the design forces 
and the strength of each component making up the anchor cap 
connection between the helical anchors and the pool slab.  
Component elements of both the as-designed and the as-built 
field modified connections were investigated.  Knowing the 
relative strengths of the component elements of the 
connection, a hypothetical failure hierarchy based on 
component strengths was determined.  Although the 
structurally weak link in the anchorage system was known in 
advance from field observations of the failed anchor cap weld, 
it is of interest to assess the other components of the 
anchorage system. 
 
Design strength analyses were consistent with relevant 
sections of ACI 318 (American Concrete Institute, Building 
Code Requirements for Structural Concrete) and AISC 




Design Load of an Individual Anchor 
 
The governing design load (critical load case for structural 
design) acting on the helical anchors occurs when the pool is 
empty and the groundwater table is at its highest.  This 
scenario results in a hydrostatic uplift pressure equal to the 
groundwater pressure minus the dead load downward pressure 
of the pool slab. 
 
The groundwater pressure is equal to the density of water 
times the distance between the bottom of the pool slab and the 
highest potential groundwater level.  As noted earlier, the 
static groundwater level, as given in the project geotechnical 
report, was about 1.5 m (5 ft) below the existing grades. 
Taking into consideration the seasonal fluctuation of up to 4 
feet and building elevations, the bottom of the pool slab could 
be 3.8 m (12.4 ft) below the highest potential groundwater 
level corresponding to a groundwater pressure of about 775 
psf.  The dead load pressure of the slab, estimated as the 
density of reinforced concrete (150 pcf) times the thickness of 
the slab (1.5 ft), is 225 psf.  For design purposes, the 
groundwater pressure and dead load pressure are multiplied by 
appropriate load factors, as specified by ASCE 7 (Minimum 
Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures), to account 
for deviations and uncertainties in determining the actual 
loads.  The most unfavorable load combination, using 
allowable stress design procedure (the design procedure 
indicated on the design drawings), results from a load factor of 
1.0 times the groundwater pressure (acting upward) and a load 
factor of 0.6 times the dead load pressure (acting downward), 
resulting in a net uplift pressure of 640 psf (1,037.5 psf using 
load factors appropriate for strength design procedure).  Given 
that the tributary area of helical anchors used for the 
swimming pool was 78.56 sq. ft. (9 ft by 8.73 ft), the 
maximum required uplift resistance based on allowable stress 
design is based on a service load of 50.3 kips (or 81.5 kips 
using strength design), significantly larger than the service 
load of 27 kips specified on the design drawings. 
 
 
Failure Modes at the Anchor Cap Connection  
 
There are eight primary failure modes associated with the 
originally designed anchorage system connection.  Each 
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would need to be checked in order to ensure adequate strength 
to resist uplift forces on the pin-connected helical pile anchor 
caps.  The eight failure modes are: 
 
1. Concrete breakout 
2. Anchor pullout (from concrete slab) 
3. Yielding of the gross section of the steel pipe 
4. Rupture of the net section of the steel pipe 
5. Shear rupture at the pin-connection 
6. Shear rupture of the bolt 
7. Bearing at the bolt hole 
8. Weld between the cap plate and steel pipe 
 
These eight failure modes were checked for resistance to the 
specified tension design load of 27 kips as shown on the 
drawings.  In addition to these failure modes associated with 
the anchor cap, our analysis indicates the anchor/soil pull-out 
capacity is also insufficient, based on the design load as 
calculated in previous section. 
 
Concrete breakout and anchor pullout relate to failure within 
the concrete slab.  The strength of the anchor cap based on 
these two failure modes can be reasonably assessed following 
the guidelines in Appendix D (Anchoring to Concrete) of the 
ACI 318 Building Code.  The concrete breakout strength 
could also arguably be assessed following the provisions of 
Chapter 11.11 (Provisions for Slabs and Footings) of the ACI 
318 Building Code.  The anchor pullout strength was found to 
be adequate and therefore not a concern.  However, the 
concrete breakout strength was found to be inadequate 
compared to the specified service design tensile load of 27 
kips, regardless of whether it is assessed using Appendix D or 
Chapter 11.11 of the ACI 318 Building Code. 
 
The remaining six failure modes relate to failure within the 
steel pile cap and their strength can be adequately assessed 
following the guidelines of the AISC Steel Construction 
Manual.  Based on Hubbell/Chance literature for the pile cap 
fabrication, Fig. 3, the steel pipe could be either ASTM A53 
Grade B or ASTM A500 Grade B steel which have slightly 
different material properties.  For analysis purposes, ASTM 
A53, Grade B steel was assumed. 
 
Design strengths for yielding of the gross section and rupture 
of the net section of the steel pipe were evaluated following 
Chapter D, Section D2, of the Thirteenth Edition AISC 
Specification.  Results indicated that the anchor cap pipe was 
insufficient to resist the specified service design load of 27 
kips. 
 
The design strength for shear rupture at the pin-connection 
was evaluated in a manner consistent with Chapter D, Section 
D5, of the AISC Specifications and was found to be adequate 
to resist the specified service level design load of 27 kips, but 
would not have been sufficient to resist the maximum design 
load as calculated in the Design Load of an Individual Anchor 
Section, above. 
 
In the original anchor cap connection design by 
Hubbell/Chance, a ¾-inch diameter ASTM A320, Grade L7 
bolt was indicated, Fig. 3.  The allowable shear strength of the 
bolt was evaluated following Chapter J, Section J3.6, of the 
AISC Specifications and found to be inadequate to resist the 
specified design service load of 27 kips.  It should be noted, 
however, that because ASTM A320, Grade L7 bolts are not 
covered in the AISC Specification the properties for an ASTM 
A325 bolt were used for analysis.  The ASTM A325 high 
strength bolt has nearly the same minimum tensile strength as 
an ASTM A320, Grade L7 bolt (120 ksi vs. 125 ksi) and 
similar minimum yield strengths (92 ksi vs. 105 ksi). 
 
The lowest allowable strength was found to be associated with 
a bearing failure at the bolt hole.  This failure mode was 
evaluated using Chapter J, Section J7, of the AISC 
Specifications and was found to be significantly less than the 
specified service design load of 27 kips. 
 
The weld strength connecting the steel pipe and ½-inch cap 
plate was checked consistent with Chapter J, Section J2.4, of 
the AISC Specifications.  Since the exact details for the weld 
size and type of electrode used were not specified, it was 
assumed that a ⅛-inch fillet weld with E70 electrode was 
used.  This is in accordance with what would typically be 
prescribed based on guidance from the AISC Specifications, 
considering the pipe wall thickness of ⅛ in.  Calculation 
results indicated that the maximum service load permitted 
based on allowable weld stresses was about half the specified 
design service load of 27 kips. 
 
 
Field Modified Weld Connection 
 
Evidently, due to constructability issues related to variable 
shaft cutoff elevations, the pre-drilled holes in helical anchor 
shafts were not at the required theoretical design elevation.  
This required the original pin-connected anchor cap design to 
be abandoned for a welded connection.  In the modified 
connection, the square anchor shaft was inserted through a 
hole cut in the ½ inch thick plate of the anchor cap and then 
welded directly to it. 
 
This modification changed the load path such that the last six 
failure modes discussed in previous section, are replaced by a 
single potential failure mode governed by the strength of the 
weld between anchor shaft and end plate.  The weld strength 
was evaluated following the guidelines of Chapter J, Section 
J2.4, of the AISC Specification.  Based on field observations 
of this weld and consistent with recommendations from the 
AISC Specification, the weld was assumed to be a 3/16 inch 
fillet weld using an E70 electrode. 
 
When the weld is considered to be a fillet weld, the allowable 
tensile force permitted was found to be approximately 62% of 
the specified design service load of 27 kips and much less than 
the maximum design service load calculated in Section Design 
Load of an Individual Anchor above. 
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A photograph of the actual cap assembly, Fig. 4, shows this 
weld not to be a true fillet weld, but rather it resembles a 
partial penetration butt weld.  In any case, the photograph 
shows that the weld quality was not consistent with a 
quantifiable weld procedure and any strength calculations for 
this weld are somewhat speculative.  Allowable design values 
calculated using the AISC Specifications are based on quality 
welds made by certified welders.  The welds observed in the 
field were not consistent with good weld quality and therefore 
could be expected to have strengths less than that calculated 
by the AISC Specifications. 
 
 
Consideration of Anchorage Failure Hierarchy 
 
As discussed in previous sections, even if the anchor cap 
connection had been constructed as originally designed, it still 
would have been vulnerable to possible failure because it 
possessed inadequate design strength for a variety of other 
failure modes.  A hierarchy of failure modes for the original 
design based on calculations consistent with ACI 318 and 
Thirteenth Edition AISC Specification procedures, listed in 
ascending order starting with the mode possessing the least 
resistance to tensile force is: 
 
1. Bearing at the bolt hole 
2. Concrete breakout 
3. Weld between the cap plate and steel pipe 
4. Yielding of the gross section of the steel pipe 
5. Rupture of the net section of the steel pipe 
6. Shear rupture of the bolt 
7. Shear rupture at the pin-connection 
8. Anchor pullout 
 
As a result of the modified as-built anchor cap connection, the 
calculated hierarchy of failure modes is as follows: 
 
1. Concrete breakout 
2. Weld between anchor shaft and ½ inch steel plate 
3. Anchor pullout 
 
It should be noted that the concrete breakout strength is based 
on a 28-day concrete compressive strength of 4,000 psi though 
it is anticipated that the actual concrete strength achieved was 
higher.  Furthermore, as mentioned in previous section the 
weld quality between the anchor shaft and cap plate is of poor 
quality and likely to exhibit less strength than predicted by the 
AISC Specification calculations.  These two factors offer an 
explanation as to why calculations indicated that concrete 
breakout could have occurred prior to weld failure in the as-






The original design documents for the pool slab anchorage 
system showed a single pin connection linking helical anchor 
shafts with the cap assembly needed to transfer uplift forces 
between the pool’s bottom slab and helical anchors.  This 
connection was field modified to a welded connection, 
presumably to correct a constructability issue resulting from 
variable helical anchor shaft cutoff lengths, which made the 
original pin-connection impossible.  Pool slab uplift failure 
was a direct result of the complete fracture and separation of 
the weld used in the modified connections.  However, there 
were a number of other concerns and a potential failure 
hierarchy revealed during analysis of other possible failure 
modes associated with the anchor cap assembly.  Structural 
concerns were prevalent in both the original design as well as 
in the modified design. 
 
Uplift forces calculated for the original design were found to 
be non-conservative, particularly when the groundwater table 
fluctuation criteria reported in the project geotechnical report 
are considered.  Moreover, the service design load of 27 kips 
indicated on the structural drawings was higher than the 20 
kips capacity for the pile cap connection provided in the 
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